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MACROECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF 
MARKET MANIPULATION 
GINA-GAIL S. FLETCHER* 
I 
INTRODUCTION
The 2008 financial crisis exposed significant weaknesses and gaps in the
regulation of the financial markets. Prior to the crisis, regulation was firm-specific 
and bank-centric, focusing almost exclusively on the safety and soundness of 
depository institutions.1 In the wake of the crisis, lawmakers and regulators have 
shifted their attention to developing “macroprudential” forms of market 
regulation—emphasizing the health and stability of the financial markets as a
whole, and enacting legislation and regulations focused more on systemic 
stability, firm interconnections, and market contagion. This expanded regulatory
view of systemic risk is evidenced in the creation of the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council;2 the identification of financial market utilities as being of 
systemic significance; and the designation of large, interconnected non-bank 
institutions as systemically important, among other things.3 Similarly, academics 
have asserted a broader conceptualization of financial stability regulation to
include the use of monetary policy as a tool for financial regulation;4 the 
classification and regulation of systemically significant prices and indices;5 and 
the importance of tracking leverage used in credit derivatives to determine the
effect on money supply in the markets.6 
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1. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Markets, Systemic Risk, and the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 61 SMU L.
REV. 209, 212 (2008) (“Existing protections against systemic risk . . . focus almost exclusively on banks, 
not markets. Furthermore, general regulatory protections against market failure . . . are not directed 
against systemic risk per se.”). 
2.  12 U.S.C. § 5321 (2018). 
3. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
4. See, e.g. Jeremy C. Stein, Monetary Policy as Financial Stability Regulation, 127 Q.J. ECON. 57, 
58 (2012). 
5. See generally Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, Systemically Significant Prices, 2 J. FIN.
REG. 1 (2016) (creating a general account of systemically important prices and indices and the market 
vulnerabilities they can create). 
6. See Margaret M. Blair, Making Money: Leverage and Private Sector Money Creation, 36
SEATTLE U. L. REV 417, 439, 449 (2013) (noting that “leverage matters because it determines the amount 
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Notably absent from these more comprehensive approaches to financial 
regulation are discussions of how—and to what extent—market manipulation
can have macroeconomic consequences for the financial markets. On the one 
hand, this oversight is understandable. Although market manipulation is as old
as the markets themselves, manipulative schemes are usually limited in scope and 
impact.7 Efforts to manipulate the market typically target specific assets, such as 
the security of a given firm or a specific commodity like oil, copper, or gold, and,
therefore, the impact of these schemes is limited in time and scope. On the other
hand, this oversight is problematic. Manipulation undermines the efficient 
allocation of capital; impairs investors’ trust and, by extension, willingness to
participate in the markets; and imposes significant social and financial costs on 
the markets. Indeed, the consequences of manipulation, despite being limited in 
some regard, extend beyond the capital markets, affecting interest rates, retail
investors, and consumers and suppliers of goods in the real economy.8 Although
this has always been true of manipulation, market developments have increased 
the impact of such schemes, forcing reconsideration of the inclusion of 
manipulation in the discourse on macroprudential financial regulation.
This Article offers an initial exploration of how market manipulation can
contribute to instability within the financial markets. Manipulative techniques
and strategies have evolved alongside the markets, expanding both the
mechanisms available to wrongdoers aiming to distort the markets and the 
consequences of such schemes on financial stability. Recent examples of market
misconduct have highlighted the far-reaching potential consequences of 
manipulation. More than a temporary dampening of liquidity or the short-term 
price inefficiency of a single asset, modern manipulation strategies can 
exacerbate volatility, weaken intermarket networks, and amplify asset 
mispricing. Manipulation, therefore, can expose systemic vulnerabilities in the
markets and can have macroeconomic consequences for the markets. 
To include manipulation as a consideration in a macroprudential approach to
financial regulation requires analyzing how these schemes impact stability or 
expose vulnerabilities in the financial markets. Identification of the channels 
through which manipulation implicates system-wide concerns is important to 
understanding the extent to which macroprudential regulation may limit 
manipulation’s macroeconomic consequences. This Article demonstrates that 
manipulation can have macroeconomic consequences when it (i) weakens intra-
firm and intra-market networks, decreasing the resiliency of the markets to
respond to shocks; (ii) increases market volatility, transmitting instability through
the market; and (iii) results in continued asset mispricing, amplifying the impact 
of highly leveraged transactions. In considering the macroeconomic 
of new credit that financial institutions can create, and credit, like money, provides the grease that keeps
the economy humming”). 
7.  Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Benchmark Regulation, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1929, 1940 (2017). 
8. Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Legitimate Yet Manipulative: The Conundrum of Open-Market
Manipulation, 68 DUKE L.J. 479, 489 (2018) [hereinafter Fletcher, Legitimate Yet Manipulative]. 
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consequences of manipulation, the focus of this Article is not merely on systemic 
risk.9 Rather, the emphasis is on ways in which manipulation may directly or 
indirectly contribute to systemic vulnerabilities, such as weakening the market’s 
resiliency to risk or amplifying the likelihood of systemic failure. By analyzing 
the ways in which manipulation can expose or exacerbate systemic 
vulnerabilities, even if these manipulative schemes do not result in systemic 
failures, this Article assesses subtler ways in which such schemes can contribute
to an increase in risk in the markets. 
Part II lays the groundwork for understanding market manipulation. It begins 
with a discussion of how manipulation is identified and of burgeoning forms of 
manipulation that exploit modern market structure. Part II also discusses the 
inherent limitations of traditional manipulation schemes that restricted their 
impact on the broader financial market. Part III uses three market examples to 
explore how manipulation can have a macroeconomic impact on the financial 
markets. Before concluding, Part IV provides an early discussion of the potential 
contours of a macroprudential approach to market manipulation. 
II
THE IMPACT OF MANIPULATION
Manipulation is generally viewed as a microeconomic concern—its impact is
more pronounced for specific assets, individuals, or firms and less pronounced on
a systemic level. This point of view is certainly valid with respect to more
traditional forms of market manipulation such as corners, squeezes, wash trading, 
and pump-and-dump, among others.10 The impact of these types of schemes is 
inherently limited and unlikely to have systemic consequences for the markets. 
However, developments in the financial markets—and manipulative strategies— 
have expanded the potential scope and impact of manipulation, increasing the 
systemic vulnerabilities that may arise from these schemes. This Part explores
more traditional forms of manipulation, and examines market changes that have 
expanded the potential impact of manipulation.
A. Limits on Manipulation’s Impact 
Although the strategies underlying traditional manipulation vary, the
structure and mechanics of the schemes inherently limit their impact on the 
broader financial markets. A primary limitation on the scope of traditional 
manipulation is the type of market in which such schemes are most successful. 
Specifically, traditional manipulation is highly effective in illiquid, 
9. Systemic risk is best defined as “the risk that (i) an economic shock such as market or
institutional failure triggers (through a panic or otherwise) either (X) the failure of a chain of markets or
institutions or (Y) a chain of significant losses to financial institutions, (ii) resulting in increases in the 
cost of capital or decreases in its availability, often evidenced by substantial financial-market price 
volatility.” Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 204 (2008). 
10. See generally Tom C.W. Lin, The New Market Manipulation, 66 EMORY L.J. 1253 (2017) 
(discussing and defining both traditional and new forms of market manipulation). 
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informationally-inefficient markets.11 The Over-The-Counter (OTC) Bulletin 
Boards and the Pink Sheets, for example, are smaller, illiquid markets, which 
feature low-value, thinly-traded stocks known as penny stocks.12 In less liquid
markets such as these, each trade is likely to impact the price of the stock because 
there are few counterparties with whom to trade. Additionally, the absence of 
required disclosure means that any information is likely to have a meaningful 
impact on the price of the stock. Thus, manipulators aiming to successfully distort 
stock prices target penny stocks because of their susceptibility to manipulation.13 
Pump-and-dump schemes, for example, are common in penny stocks because
manipulators can exploit the informational inefficiencies of the market to spread 
false rumors, increase the price of the stock, and sell at a profit.14 Using this basic 
formula on thinly traded shares has netted manipulators untold sums of illicit
profits.15 These schemes are welfare-reducing and impose substantial costs on 
investors and the markets, but they do not introduce systemic risk to the financial 
markets because they target discrete, illiquid market segments. Manipulation of 
penny stocks, even if significant in volume and number, does not result in 
instability in the financial markets because penny stocks are not fundamental to
the markets’ operations or functions. Thus, the focus of traditional manipulation
schemes on distorting illiquid markets naturally limits the potential macro-level 
impact of these schemes. 
Relatedly, traditional manipulation schemes are limited because they target 
a single asset for distortion. Strategies such as fictitious trades, corners, and
squeezes, for example, focus on manipulating the price of a single asset for illicit 
gain. With fictitious trades, such as wash trading or matched orders, a trader 
(either individually or as part of a group) acts as both the buyer and seller of a 
security, creating the illusion of more trading in the security than there is in
actuality.16 Similarly, a trader may corner the market for a commodity by
acquiring and exploiting a dominant position in the market. Because of her 
market power, the manipulator is able to set monopolistic prices for the 
commodity, thereby circumventing the “natural” forces of supply and demand.
Regardless of the strategy employed in these instances, the manipulative scheme
centers on a single commodity or security; thus, the stability of the financial 
markets is not threatened. 
11. Fletcher, Legitimate Yet Manipulative, supra note 8, at 528–29. 
12. See Lin, supra note 10, at 1284 (discussing penny stocks); see also Fletcher, Legitimate Yet 
Manipulative, supra note 8, at 528 (discussing OTC Bulletin Boards and Pink Sheets). 
13. See Joseph I. Goldstein, Paul D. Ramshaw & Sarah B. Ackerson, An Investment Masquerade: A
Descriptive Overview of Penny Stock Fraud and the Federal Securities Laws, 47 BUS. LAW. 773, 774–76 
(1991) (explaining the advantages of targeting penny stocks for fraud). 
14. This description is similarly applicable to the inverse scheme—the short-and-distort—in which 
manipulators spread false rumors to depress the price of the stock and buy at a profit. 
15. See, e.g., Max de Haldevang & Justin Rohrlich, How an Undercover FBI Sting Busted an Alleged 
Multimillion-Dollar Stock Fraud, QUARTZ (July 26, 2019), https://qz.com/1675811/how-an-undercover-
fbi-sting-busted-a-multimillion-dollar-stock-fraud/ [https://perma.cc/V3V8-FEZV].
 16. Fletcher, Legitimate Yet Manipulative, supra note 8, at 499. 
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Lastly, traditional manipulation schemes are typically short-term in nature.
Traders face various obstacles to sustaining their manipulation, which limit the 
negative consequences that may arise from the misconduct. With a corner, for 
example, the trader must expend resources to acquire and maintain her dominant 
position in the market. And, if her corner involves a physical commodity, then 
she may need additional capital to transport and store the commodity, in addition
to standard transaction fees.17 The capital-intensive nature of some forms of
manipulation, therefore, limits the potential impact of such schemes on the wider 
financial markets. 
Even schemes that are based on misinformation are unsustainable in the long-
term. Setting aside informationally-inefficient markets discussed above, 
manipulation based on misinformation is unlikely to have systemic consequences
because of the informational efficiency of robust, liquid markets. Information
must be credible to affect the price of an asset and, in efficient markets, the
markets can debunk false information quickly, thereby limiting the lifespan of 
the scheme. For example, in 2015, a fake tender offer for Avon Products, Inc. was 
filed with the SEC, which resulted in a twenty percent increase in Avon’s stock 
price.18 However, the markets quickly uncovered the fraudulent nature of the 
filing, causing the stock price to fall to its pre-fraud tender offer levels less than 
twenty-four hours later.19 This result is emblematic of how the market’s efficiency 
serves as a natural constraint on the impact of manipulation.20 
In sum, traditional market manipulation schemes do not expose the financial 
markets to systemic instability. These schemes undeniably are welfare-reducing
and imposed high social costs on the markets, but they are inherently limited in 
impact. However, evolutions in the markets have expanded the potential scope 
and effect of market manipulation. Such developments have notably enhanced
the potential systemic repercussions of market manipulation, increasing its 
importance in the discourse on financial stability regulation. 
B. Market Developments & the Expansion of Manipulation’s Impact 
The financial markets have undergone three significant structural and 
technological changes that increase their efficiency and operation, and therefore
directly and indirectly amplify the potential macro-level effect of market 
misconduct. First, the markets are more networked, both in terms of connections 
17. See Craig Pirrong, Commodity Market Manipulation Law: A (Very) Critical Analysis and a 
Proposed Alternative, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 945, 954 n.20 (1994) (“Marginal costs of delivery are 
typically increasing for ‘spatial commodities.’”). 




20. Indeed, this natural restraint is one reason Professors Daniel Fischel and David Ross argue that
manipulation is self-deterring in informationally-efficient markets. See Daniel R. Fischel & David J. 
Ross, Should the Law Prohibit “Manipulation” in Financial Markets?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 503, 518–19 
(1991) (explaining that because manipulators face “tremendous risk” that transaction costs outweigh
price increase, and there is no guarantee of sale at profit, price pressure schemes are self-deterring).
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between firms and between market sectors. Second, technological changes have 
increased the speed by which volatility can spread through the markets,
potentially destabilizing numerous actors, or, alternately, large systemically
important actors in the market. Third, financial innovation has increased the use
of and reliance on leverage, which increases the potential for market instability 
in response to manipulation. 
1. Networked Markets 
Markets are more interconnected now than ever before—both in terms of 
linkages among financial institutions and market segments. As institutions
borrow and lend among each other, enter into derivatives and other financial 
contracts as counterparties, and invest in the same asset classes, interconnections
are created among them, both directly and indirectly.21 Similarly, old divisions 
between market segments are rendered less meaningful in modern markets in 
which a single transaction may implicate both the commodities and securities 
markets, for example.22 In increasingly globalized financial markets, such 
interconnections are expected and even necessary for their efficient function. 
Yet, during times of stress these financial networks may undermine financial 
stability. Intra-firm and intra-market connections may become fragile during 
times of shock, and these networks may transmit and amplify distress among 
institutions and markets.23 Thus, these linkages enhance the potential effects of 
manipulation because the financial distress resulting from such schemes may spill 
over to other markets, assets, and institutions. Price volatility and inefficiency 
stemming from market manipulation, for example, may spread within financial 
networks, setting off a chain reaction that propagates the consequences of 
manipulation beyond its original sphere of impact. Therefore, to the extent 
manipulation undermines or weakens these networks, it may have 
macroeconomic consequences for the financial markets. 
2. Technological Advances 
Technological advances have transformed the markets, expanding the 
potential reach of manipulative conduct. Specifically, the financial markets have 
become faster and more computerized. Gone are the days in which human
brokers or floor traders intermediated transactions on the securities or 
commodities exchange. Today, computers running sophisticated algorithms are
21. DTCC, UNDERSTANDING INTERCONNECTED RISKS TO BUILD A MORE RESILIENT
FINANCIAL SYSTEM 5 (Oct. 2015), http://www.dtcc.com/news/2015/october/12/understanding-
interconnectedness-risks-article/ [https://perma.cc/9Y9T-QWH2].  
22. JOHN J. MURPHY, TRADING WITH INTERMARKET ANALYSIS: A VISUAL APPROACH TO
BEATING THE FINANCIAL MARKETS USING EXCHANGE-TRADED FUNDS 3 (2012). 
23. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Bail-Ins Versus Bail-Outs: Using Contingent Capital to Mitigate Systemic 
Risk 1 (Ctr. for Law and Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 380, 2010) (explaining that the U.S. subprime
mortgage crisis, a localized economic shock, nearly caused the meltdown of global capital markets.). 
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able to execute a high volume of transactions within a fraction of a second.24 Most 
algorithmic trading programs are designed to exploit arbitrage opportunities in 
the markets, profiting on small discrepancies in asset prices, which is only feasible
as a strategy if done over thousands of trades.25 Another key feature of trading in 
the modern market is the speed with which algorithms can execute transactions. 
And, importantly, this speed is essential to the profitability of algorithmic trading 
programs: only by trading faster than competitors are traders in modern-day
markets able to profit.26 
The integration of computers and algorithmic trading programs into the 
financial markets has fundamentally altered how these markets operate.
Algorithmic trading accounts for upwards of fifty percent of the trading volume
in the securities and commodities markets.27 These technological advances have 
resulted in notable benefits for the markets, including increased liquidity, 
enhanced pricing efficiency, and reduced transaction costs.28 However, the rise of 
algorithmic trading, specifically high-frequency trading (HFT), also amplifies the
potential impact of manipulative misconduct.29 HFT firms place and cancel 
orders rapidly, often within a milliseconds or less, relying on speed to gain an 
advantage in the market. HFT firms earn small gains on individual executed 
trades (on average a fraction of a penny), but net large profits when aggregated 
across thousands of trades each day.30 Importantly, HFT may be utilized to 
manipulate the markets and, owing to its high speed and volume, it can generate 
systemic harm within the markets.31 Indeed, in the HFT-dominated markets of 
today, manipulators can impose significant, widescale harm more easily and more
quickly than previously possible. Automated HFT programs operating in today’s 
24. Jonathan Keehner, Milliseconds Are Focus in Algorithmic Trades, REUTERS (May 10, 2007, 8:24 
PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-exchanges-summit-algorithm/milliseconds-are-focus-in-algori/
thmic-trades-idUSN1046529820070511 [https://perma.cc/6DBH-ETYH]. 
25. Michael J. McGowan, The Rise of Computerized High Frequency Trading: Use and Controversy, 
16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. ¶1 (2010). 
26. Id. ¶ 3. 
27. RENA S. MILLER & GARY SHORTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS REP. R44443: HIGH
FREQUENCY TRADING: OVERVIEW OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS i (Apr. 4, 2016). 
28. Charles R. Korsmo, High-Frequency Trading: A Regulatory Strategy, 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 523, 
549–50 (2015). 
29. Although there is no standard definition for HFT, the term broadly refers to a method of trading
combining algorithmic trading with high-speed, high-volume trading to profit on small price
discrepancies in the markets. See Andrew J. Keller, Robocops: Regulating High Frequency Trading after 
the Flash Crash of 2010, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1457, 1463 (2012) (broadly defining HFT as a subset of
algorithmic trading characterized by its use of speed and volume to gain advantages in the market.); see 
also IIRC INST. & STEVENS INST. OF TECH., WHITE PAPER ON HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING 2 (Sept. 
2014) https://web.stevens.edu/ses/documents/fileadmin/documents/pdf/Final%20Sept%202014%/20HF/ 
T.pdf [https://perma.cc/UES9-V2Z9] (detailing the five characteristics the SEC uses to identify HFT, 
which generally describe a trading strategy using sophisticated technology to “generat[e], rout[e], and
execut[e]” numerous orders).
30. Keller, supra note 29, at 1458. 
31. See McGowan, supra note 25, ¶ 4 (“Today, high frequency firms . . . ‘account for 73% of all U.S.
equity trading volume’ . . . . [HFT]’s role now overshadows that of mainstream brokers, mutual funds and 
hedge funds.”). 
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interconnected markets can exacerbate volatility during periods of distress, 
thereby increasing the likelihood of systemic repercussions stemming from 
potential market misconduct. 
3. Financial Innovation & Leverage
Financial innovation has also contributed to the amplification of
manipulation’s potential impact on the markets. The introduction and 
popularization of new financial instruments, trading processes, and financial
institutions have increased market efficiency and liquidity, decreased transaction 
costs, and facilitated growth of the financial sector. Financial innovation has 
enhanced the productive allocation of capital in the markets and, similarly, the 
efficient allocation of risks among market actors. Oftentimes, financial 
innovation is geared towards increasing the supply of credit in the financial 
markets, especially when leverage is used.32 Leverage refers to the use of 
borrowed capital to make investments, which greatly increase the potential
returns on an investment in good times. But, in bad times, a highly leveraged
transaction can have significant, negative repercussions for an institution and the 
broader financial markets. The extent to which financial innovation increases 
leverage in the markets, therefore, can have significant macroeconomic 
consequences by enhancing the potential risks inherent to highly leveraged
transactions.33 
A major innovation in the financial markets has been credit derivatives, 
particularly credit default swaps (CDS). CDS are financial instruments that allow 
parties to shift the risk of a debt issuer’s default between themselves. In a credit 
default swap, one party (the protection buyer) pays periodic premiums to another 
party (the protection seller) and, in exchange, the seller agrees to compensate the 
buyer if a debt issuer defaults on an outstanding loan obligation, which is known 
as a “credit event.”34 CDS increase the credit availability in the markets directly, 
by providing a form of insurance against debt and freeing up capital for other 
investments; and indirectly, because CDS are usually highly leveraged
transactions. Leverage in CDS transactions typically arises because the
protection seller does not provide all the funds upfront to guarantee its future 
payment if there is a credit event. A protection seller, therefore, has a small 
percentage of the funds committed upfront, which increases potential profits 
from the transaction but also amplifies potential losses, which may be
systemically significant if the protection seller is called upon to compensate the 
32. See Margaret M. Blair, Financial Innovation, Leverage, Bubbles and the Distribution of Income, 
30 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225, 229 (2010) (“[F]inancial innovation has made it possible for financial 
firms . . . to supply too much credit to others and to borrow too much in order to provide this credit.”). 
33. See Erik F. Gerding, Credit Derivatives, Leverage, and Financial Regulation’s Missing 
Macroeconomic Dimension, 8 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 29, 32 (2011) (“[C]redit derivatives and leverage also
can have significant macroeconomic effects.”). 
34. See Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Engineered Credit Default Swaps: Innovative or Manipulative?, 94
N.Y.U. L. REV. 101, 110 (2019). 
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protection buyer.35 Thus, efforts to distort CDS in ways that impact credit events 
and result in risk being mispriced can expose systemic fragility because of the
highly leveraged nature of these transactions. 
In sum, market developments have altered the potential reach of 
manipulation, such that distortive schemes can have macroeconomic 
consequences for the market. Part III analyzes modern day manipulation 
schemes that exploit the new market infrastructure and instruments to assess how
these schemes can expose or amplify systemic vulnerabilities in the financial
markets. 
III
MANIPULATION & FINANCIAL STABILITY
Key to including manipulation in the discourse on macroprudential 
regulation is understanding how it could translate into, or otherwise exacerbate, 
financial stability. Evolved manipulation schemes are no longer superficial efforts 
to distort a single price; rather, these schemes target structural aspects of the 
market in ways that can have system-wide reverberations throughout it. The
ability of manipulation to impair basic market functions—and by extension,
financial stability—warrants including manipulation in discussions of
macroprudential forms of market regulation. Yet, for these discussions to be
productive, it is necessary to understand how manipulation can impact financial 
stability. 
This Part analyzes the channels through which manipulation can contribute
to, amplify, or transmit potential financial stability. Importantly, the potential
effect of modern manipulation on financial stability is on a continuum. Whereas 
some forms of manipulation may contribute to systemic harm, others expose 
vulnerabilities in the markets, weakening the market’s resiliency but do not, in 
and of themselves, cause systemic failures. Yet, despite merely exposing 
vulnerabilities, it is nonetheless important to understand the linkages between 
manipulation and system-level vulnerabilities to effectively address the harm that
can accompany these schemes. 
A. Benchmark Manipulation & Vulnerable Networks 
The financial market is built on interconnections among institutions,
products, and markets. In considering connections within the financial market,
one is most easily drawn to the linkages among financial institutions that transact 
with each other, acting as counterparties, guarantors, and intermediaries to each
other. A less obvious connection among financial institutions stems from their 
reliance on the same set of benchmarks to value commodities, derivatives, and 
other financial obligations. Benchmarks aggregate multiple sources of market 
data into a single metric, such as a price or index. Importantly, benchmarks
35. See Gerding, supra note 33, at 41–42 (“[T]he default of a major derivative counterparty may have
severe spillover effects on entire financial markets . . . .”). 
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standardize the valuation of financial contracts, increasing the liquidity of the
instrument.36 Financial transactions that rely on a standardized, market-accepted
benchmark to value parties’ relative obligations are more easily tradable than 
ones that use a bespoke benchmark. 
For example, interest-rate derivatives that reference the London Interbank 
Offered Rate (LIBOR), once considered to be the most widely-used interest rate
benchmark, are more liquid and more widely-traded than other interest rate
referents.37 Indeed, LIBOR’s use is not limited to the world of high finance, but 
it is used to set interest rates for consumer loans, such as mortgages and student 
loans.38 Relatedly, some commodities are priced in relation to benchmarks. 
Trading in oil, for example, is primarily bilateral and OTC, making it difficult for 
the market to accurately gauge its price. The Brent Crude Oil Index is one of the
primary benchmarks used to price oil. This index provides a benchmark against 
which oil can be priced for derivatives, financial obligations, and even consumer 
petroleum prices.39 In good times, these benchmark-based linkages can lower 
information and transaction costs in the markets. However, in bad times, 
especially if the benchmark is distorted, these linkages can contribute to systemic 
harm in the markets.40 Manipulation of a ubiquitous benchmark, therefore, can
have consequences that extend to the broader financial markets. 
In 2012, regulators uncovered systematic efforts to manipulate both LIBOR 
and the WM/Reuters FX Benchmark, the most popular foreign exchange
benchmark.41 In both manipulative schemes, traders at the world’s largest banks
exploited the innately conflicted process by which the benchmarks were created
so that they could profit on their derivatives positions at the expense of clients.42 
Although there was no systemic failure that resulted from these benchmark
manipulation schemes, it has been argued that these schemes exposed 
vulnerabilities in the markets by weakening the networks related to the 
manipulated benchmarks.43 
The macroeconomic consequences of manipulation of ubiquitous 
benchmarks are two-fold. First, distortion of a widely-used benchmark calls into
question the valuation of derivatives that reference the benchmark. This could
result in larger-than-expected margin calls for some market participants, as the 
value of the contract fluctuates in response to manipulation. To the extent that
36. Fletcher, Benchmark Regulation, supra note 7, at 1943–44. 
37. Understanding Investing: Interest Rate Swaps, PIMCO, https://europe.pimco.com/en-
eu/resources/education/understanding-interest-rate-swaps [https://perma.cc/4XAE-GN5P].
 38. Id. at 1931. 
39. Id. at 1958–59. 
40. Indeed, Professors Hockett and Omarova have defined some benchmarks as “systemically
important prices and indices” because of their ubiquity in various aspects of the markets. Hockett &
Omarova, supra note 5. 
41. Fletcher, Benchmark Regulation, supra note 7, at 1935. 
42. Id.
 43. See generally Hockett & Omarova, supra note 5 (analyzing how systemically significant 
benchmarks can expose systemic harms in the financial markets). 
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multiple financial institutions have instruments and contracts on their balance
sheets that reference the benchmark, they are similarly exposed to the risk of re-
valuation of these transactions and, importantly, increased margin calls. The 
wide-scale mispricing of assets that reference the manipulated benchmark can 
stress the networks of actors that rely on the benchmark, resulting in multiple 
market actors facing similar collateral demands that may stress their financial 
condition. Further, as large, interconnected banks have become more involved in 
the storage and trading of physical commodities,44 the manipulation of 
benchmarks used to value these physical commodities may result in significant 
losses, further weakening their resiliency within the markets. Notably, to the 
extent a benchmark has been adopted as an input or value referent in the real
economy, it connects the real economy and the financial markets to these 
benchmark-related distortions, further extending the macroeconomic 
consequences of benchmark manipulation.
Second, discovery that a fundamental benchmark has been deliberately 
manipulated weakens the integrity of the benchmark. By extension, such 
manipulation renders instruments tied to the benchmark less attractive and, as
the market moves away from the benchmark, less liquid. In fact, if the damage to
the benchmark’s integrity is profound enough, it may ring the death-knell for the 
benchmark. This would force institutions and instruments away from the
benchmark, causing significant, potentially systemic, upheavals in the market. 
Once again, LIBOR proves an illustrative example. In the wake of the 2012
scandal and the ensuing fallout, LIBOR is being phased out and is unlikely to
exist past 2021.45 The end of LIBOR, albeit gradual and over multiple years, is 
causing significant uncertainty in the markets. Financial institutions and 
counterparties are wrestling with how to modify their long-term positions that 
reference LIBOR and transition to a new benchmark.46 Many worry that the 
transition away from LIBOR will cause market-wide instability, as untold
amounts of financial obligations, derivatives, and other contracts are modified.47 
The necessary transition away from LIBOR is unchartered territory for the
markets and, notably, underscores the macro-level consequences that may arise
from the manipulation of systemically-significant benchmarks.
Given the widespread integration of benchmarks in the markets, it is not 
unwarranted to consider that benchmark manipulation and the fallout therefrom 
can have significant repercussions throughout the markets. The interconnections
44. See Saule T. Omarova, The Merchants of Wall Street: Banking, Commerce, and Commodities, 98
MINN. L. REV. 265, 268 (2013) (stating that large U.S. financial holding companies have “emerged as 
major merchants of physical commodities . . .”).
 45. Katie Hoyle, Transition Away From LIBOR: Where Are We Now?, 8 J. INT’L BANKING & FIN.
L. 520, 520 (2019). 
46. Christopher J. Click, Death of a Benchmark: The Fall of LIBOR and the Rise of Alternative Rates
in the United Kingdom and United States, 22 N.C. BANKING INST. 283, 284 (2018). 
47. Id. Indeed, the U.K.’s Wheatley Report recommended LIBOR reform rather than transition 
away from it. See generally MARTIN WHEATLEY, THE WHEATLEY REVIEW OF LIBOR: FINAL REPORT 
40 (2012). 
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that benchmarks create among institutions and markets mean that inaccurate 
valuations of financial transactions and contracts because of benchmark
manipulation could produce ripple effects through the markets—resulting in 
increased collateral requirements, diminished asset values, and tangible losses for 
consumers in the real economy. Importantly, if the manipulation is severe
enough, it can irredeemably destroy the reputation of the benchmark, causing 
the collapse of a significant market. Thus, the manipulation of ubiquitous 
benchmarks can render financial market networks vulnerable to systemic harm, 
lending support to including manipulation as a consideration with respect to 
macroprudential regulation. 
B. HFT & Disruptive Volatility 
Technological advances have played a crucial role in increasing innovation,
enhancing efficiency, and improving liquidity in the markets in the past decade.48 
Of these advances, the use of HFT has fundamentally altered how the markets 
operate.  HFT has contributed significantly to a dramatic reduction in execution
time in the markets, thereby increasing liquidity and pricing efficiency in the 
markets.49 The benefits of HFT notwithstanding, its emphasis on high-speed, 
high-volume transactions raises systemic concerns for the financial markets,
especially when one factors in manipulative behavior. Some HFT firms employ 
trading strategies that exploit their speed and volume advantages to distort asset 
prices, which may have detrimental, systemic consequences for the markets.
Pinging is one such strategy: it involves HFT traders placing small test orders at 
different price levels, then quickly exiting orders that were not filled. This 
strategy, which some liken to the use of sonar to detect large objects, allows the
trader to gauge how it ought to adjust its position to profit on its later trades.50 
Other problematic strategies include spoofing, stuffing, and smoking, to name a 
few. At base, these tactics allow HFT traders to take advantage of slower traders 
in the markets. 
These strategies also have deeper effects on the stability of the markets. While
there is a generalized fear that HFT in and of itself exposes the markets to 
systemic harm because of excessive volatility and flash crashes, these concerns 
are heightened with respect to HFT-related manipulation. The 2010 Flash
Crash—during which the prices of securities and derivatives dropped by almost 
1,000 points in minutes—serves as an example to many of the dangers of the 
combination of manipulation and HFT. In May 2010, Navinder Sarao used an 
48. Discussed supra Part II.B.2.
 49. See generally Liz Moyer & Emily Lambert, The New Masters of Wall Street, FORBES (Sept. 2,
2009, 6:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2009/0921/revolutionaries-stocks-getco-new-masters-of-
wall-street.html [https://perma.cc/76DS-8XET]; see also Jonathan Brogaard, Terrence Hendershott & 
Ryan Riordan, High-Frequency Trading and Price Discovery, 27 REV. FIN. STUD. 2267, 2303 (2014) 
(stating that HFTs contribute to price efficiency by trading in direction of permanent price changes and
against transitory pricing errors). 
50. Kristin N. Johnson, Regulating Innovation: High Frequency Trading in Dark Pools, 42 J. CORP.
L. 833, 879–80 (2017). 
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algorithm to flood the markets with millions of dollars of orders to artificially 
push down the price of a futures contract on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange
(CME) so that he could later buy the same contracts at an artificially depressed 
price.51 Sarao’s attempts at price manipulation set off a chain reaction in the 
market in which securities prices fell and rebounded in seconds and billions of 
dollars were erased from the derivatives markets, creating a liquidity crisis that 
affected trading venues beyond the CME.52 HFT algorithms exacerbated the
volatility of Sarao’s manipulation scheme, selling positions and withdrawing from 
the market en masse, thereby propagating instability of the markets. 
The Flash Crash illustrates two noteworthy macroeconomic consequences 
that arise from HFT-connected manipulation. First, HFT-related manipulation
schemes can create systemic instability that can spread through the market like 
wildfire.53 Within minutes, Sarao’s traditional manipulative scheme caused 
market-wide volatility that was spread effortlessly throughout the markets 
because of the presence of other HFT traders. The interconnections among 
market participants, financial products, and trading venues furthered the spread 
raising systemic concerns. Second, many HFT programs make similar 
assumptions about the markets and tend to have similar investment profiles. 
Importantly, HFT algorithms are highly correlated in their responses in times of
market stress, which worsens instability arising from HFT-related manipulation.54 
In response to deteriorating market conditions, there is likely a sudden and
dramatic withdrawal of liquidity from the market, as HFT firms seek to liquidate
their positions and exit the market at the same time.55 Thus, the fire-sale-like 
response destabilizes the market and exposes systemic vulnerabilities within the 
markets. 
The benefits of HFT notwithstanding, the fallout from HFT-related
manipulation is a significant source of risk to the financial markets. Volatility in 
asset prices can impose significant losses on market participants which may ripple
through the broader markets, heightening systemic concerns. For example, if 
many small market participants suffer significant losses, this may trigger a daisy
chain of losses that undermines the market’s stability and resiliency. Alternately, 
if the losses impact a large, systemically connected institution, it may likewise 
51. Complaint at 1–5, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Nav Sarao Futures Ltd. PLC,
No. 15-cv-3398 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 17, 2015); see also Press Release No. 7156-15, U.S. Commodity Futures
Trading Comm’n, CFTC Charges U.K. Resident Navinder Singh Sarao and His Company Nav Sarao 
Futures Limited PLC with Price Manipulation and Spoofing (Apr. 21, 2015), 
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7486-16 [https://perma.cc/22E6-TXAX]. 
52. Johnson, supra note 50, at 836–37; see also Roger Kenny et al., ‘Flash Crash’ a Perfect Storm for 
Markets, WALL ST. J. (May 6, 2015, 10:00 AM ET), http://graphics.wsj.com/flash-crash-timeline
[https://perma.cc/5QXS-XEJG] (describing how Sarao’s spoofing scheme caused extreme volatility in
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and other exchanges linked to NYSE’s Arca Exchange). 
53. See Linsey C. Crump, Regulating to Archive Stability in the Domain of High-Frequency Trading, 
22 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 161, 173 (2015) (“HFT-related errors and negligence can have
large-scale market ramifications.”). 
54. Johnson, supra note 50, at 859–60. 
55. Id. at 860.  
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have system-wide reverberations. HFT-related manipulation, therefore, can have 
detrimental macro-level consequences for the markets, as the ensuing volatility 
can have destabilizing consequences for the markets and market participants. 
C. Engineered Credit Default Swaps & Risk Mispricing 
As seen in the 2008 financial crisis, even in the absence of any distortion CDS 
can heighten systemic risk concerns in the financial markets. CDS create 
interconnections among large financial institutions that increase counterparty
risk—the risk that one party to the CDS may default on its obligations. Because 
of the highly leveraged nature of these transactions, the networks created
through CDS raise concerns that failure of a large, leveraged entity may lead to 
a chain reaction of multiple financial institutions collapsing causing systemic 
failure. 
An important factor in minimizing CDS counterparty risk and the potential 
contagion that may follow is the accurate pricing of the underlying insurer’s 
default risk. To the extent the parties can reliably price the issuer’s risk of default,
they ought to set collateral and premiums for the transaction to reflect the risks 
of the transaction. However, miscalculating risk in a CDS transaction may result 
in lower collateral demands, which increases the leverage of the transaction and 
lower premiums being charged. Altogether, these factors can expose the
protection seller to larger-than-anticipated losses, raising potential concerns for 
financial stability based on the size and interconnection of the protection seller. 
Mispriced CDS risk, therefore, affects both the value of the CDS and the losses 
CDS counterparties suffer in the event of larger than anticipated losses. 
Recently, CDS counterparties have engaged in transactions to “engineer” the
default of the underlying issuer to a CDS, which causes risk mispricing in CDS.
Specifically, counterparties are collaborating with issuers to engineer a profitable
outcome by guaranteeing their preferred CDS outcome—that is, forcing or 
preventing an issuer’s default in order to profit on their CDS positions.56 For 
example, the protection buyer may offer the issuer financing in exchange for the 
issuer’s promise to voluntarily default on an upcoming interest payment. Or, the
protection seller may offer the issuer financing so that the issuer restructures its
debts to be held by a subsidiary, preventing the issuer from defaulting in the 
future. Engineered transactions render CDS risk calculations and pricing moot 
as the issuer’s risk is no longer connected to its fundamental financial condition. 
This disconnect can expose the markets to systemic vulnerabilities.57 
Voluntary issuer defaults raise concerns of systemic failures of 
interconnected, leveraged counterparties to the transaction. CDS are priced to
reflect the risk of the issuer’s default based on its existing financial condition, 
historical models, and market expectations. When the issuer voluntarily defaults 
as part of a negotiated transaction with the protection buyer, the credit risk of 
56. See generally Fletcher, supra note 34. 
57. Id. 
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the CDS has been mispriced. This is because, ex ante, it did not price the risk of 
a voluntary default that is unconnected to the issuer’s credit deterioration. 
Failure to predict and price the default of the issuer may result in significant 
losses to the protection seller. To the extent that the protection seller is unable 
to meet its obligations, this may lead to losses to the protection buyer, triggering 
a domino-like cascade of failures. These losses can have macroeconomic 
consequences, which would be amplified if the transaction is highly leveraged and 
links several parties together in a network of purchase and sale of credit 
protection. Negotiated and unexpected defaults on CDS, therefore, can result in 
cascading and unexpected losses on counterparties that, in aggregate, may
introduce systemic harms into the markets. 
Additionally, counterparties’ collaboration with issuers to prevent future
default can also have macroeconomic consequences for the markets. First, 
restructuring the issuer’s debt such that it is being held by a subsidiary and, 
therefore, beyond the scope of the CDS does not make the issuer safer. Rather,
it eliminates the opportunity of debt investors to hedge their risk using CDS. If 
the issuer later defaults on its subsidiary-held debt, debt investors are worse off 
for having paid for credit protection but not having the actual benefit of 
protection. Again, this could result in significant financial losses for parties which,
if it affects many market actors, could have system-wide reverberations. 
Indirectly, these engineering strategies can reduce economic liquidity—that 
is, the supply of money and credit—in the markets. Scholars such as Margaret 
Blair and Erik Gerding have identified how leverage and CDS increase the 
effective supply of money by creating substitutes for money in the financial
markets.58 To the extent fewer parties participate in the CDS markets for fear of 
being on the losing end of one of these transactions, engineered transactions can 
decrease economic liquidity in the broader markets. Even if one considers the 
reduction in credit in the markets to be beneficial,59 that leverage and CDS can
impact economic liquidity points to the macroeconomic scope of engineered 
transactions on the financial markets, albeit indirectly. 
Lastly and relatedly, engineered transactions weaken the integrity and, by
extension, viability of the CDS market. Fearing being on the losing end of an 
engineered transaction, market actors may elect to enter into fewer transactions, 
which may have destabilizing effects on the CDS markets. Not knowing which 
issuers are collaborating with CDS counterparties, potential participants in the 
CDS markets may refrain from transacting broadly. As fewer “honest” 
counterparties remain in the markets, the CDS markets may devolve into a classic 
“lemons market.”60 Thus, taken to its extreme, though logical, conclusion, 
58. See Gerding, supra note 33, at 32 (explaining that credit derivatives increase liquidity which
increases the effective supply of money); see also Blair, Financial Innovation, supra note 32, at 231 
(“[E]xcessive leverage in the system as a whole has increased the effective supply of money and credit.”). 
59. See Blair, supra note 32, at 229. 
60. In a lemons market, buyers do not know which cars are worth their asking price and those that
are not (i.e., lemons). Thus, the buyer will simply treat all cars like lemons. The result will be that worthy
car sellers will leave the markets, being unable to get an accurate price for their product and lemon sellers
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engineered transactions may so weaken the CDS market as to make it no longer
viable.
In sum, failure of the CDS markets to accurately price issuers’ risk of default 
upends allocative efficiency of the markets, introducing vulnerabilities into the 
broader markets, and potentially triggering cascading failures of interconnected
counterparties. Additionally, engineered CDS transactions can impair the
integrity of the CDS market to the point that the market is no longer viable,
further extending the direct and indirect consequences of engineered CDS
transactions to the wider financial markets. As the above discussion
demonstrates, modern-day manipulation can expose significant vulnerabilities 
and contribute meaningfully to systemic risk in the financial markets. The 
interconnectedness of the markets and the way in which new forms of
manipulation exploit and weaken these networks lends support for manipulation
being included in the discourse on macroprudential forms of market regulation. 
Part IV explores, in broad strokes, what that can mean for regulators and the
markets going forward. 
IV 
MACROPRUDENTIAL REGULATION & MANIPULATION: PRELIMINARY 
THOUGHTS
Changes to the structure and operation of the markets have similarly altered 
the potential impact and scope of modern-day market manipulation schemes.
Today, manipulation can expose significant vulnerabilities, rendering 
interconnected institutions and markets susceptible to systemic harms. To 
properly account for the systemic risk that accompanies manipulation schemes, 
it is necessary to include manipulation in the discourse regarding
macroprudential regulation. Practically, this means including manipulation and 
the fallout therefrom as a potential source of destabilization risk in the markets. 
As discussed above, manipulation can contribute to market destabilization either 
directly, by intensifying volatility in the market, or indirectly, because parties 
withdraw from the markets to limit their exposure to manipulation. Thus, efforts 
to truly identify sources of systemic risk in the markets must account for the
potential for, and consequences of, manipulation on the financial system. 
Beyond merely including manipulation in the larger conversation on the
regulation of systemic risk, it is also fruitful to consider changes that could be
made to regulatory design to account for the macroeconomic consequences of 
manipulation. Existing manipulation regulations are microprudential: they focus 
on specific or individual harm of manipulative conduct on institutions, investors,
or assets. Embracing a macroprudential focus, such that the anti-manipulation 
framework is aimed at both minimizing manipulation and reducing systemic risk, 
would shift the philosophy of regulators towards manipulation and expand the
will remain in the market. George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 48 Q.J. ECON. 488, 489–90 (1970). 
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tools used to address it. Although largely undeveloped in academic literature, a 
macroprudential approach to manipulation would require that regulators adopt 
regulations that (i) ex ante minimize the potential of manipulative conduct to 
cause or amplify systemic harms in the financial markets; and (ii) ex post ensure
that the financial system is robust enough to mitigate negative consequences if 
and when they occur. 
A. Ex Ante Regulations 
Much of anti-manipulation law and regulation is focused on enforcement 
after misconduct has occurred. For traditional manipulative schemes, which have 
a limited impact on the financial markets, ex post regulation is efficient. It allows 
the markets to operate without restrictions that may be over or under-inclusive 
and may chill legitimate activity. An ex post regulatory approach also allows 
regulators to deploy scarce resources only when they have more accurate
information about misconduct that has already occurred. However, for 
manipulative conduct that can have systemic consequences, an ex post approach
can be detrimental to the markets. Regulating after the misconduct occurred
exposes the markets to systemic vulnerabilities for which enforcement actions 
offer an unsatisfying balm and do little to prevent future iterations of similar 
harms.
Macroprudential regulation of manipulation requires a focus on prescriptive 
regulation, especially of processes, products, or actors at the heart of potentially 
manipulative behavior. Such ex ante regulation should aim to decrease
information asymmetry and make more apparent the interconnections among 
institutions and markets that can facilitate the spread of instability throughout
the market. For example, benchmarks that can be classified as systemically
important ought to be subject to greater regulatory oversight to minimize
conflicts of interests that undermine their accuracy and reliability in the market.
Similarly, a robust regulatory framework to monitor HFT firms in the market 
would reduce the likelihood of such firms exposing the markets to excessive
volatility. Ex ante, macroprudential regulation would complement, rather than 
supplant traditional, ex post regulation, thereby better protecting the markets 
from systemic vulnerabilities. Considerations of what the scope, content, and
theoretical framing of such prescriptive regulation and the extent to which it may
effectively safeguard the markets is an area for future research. 
B. Structural Safeguards 
A macroprudential focus on manipulation would mean paying attention to
the ways in which manipulation affects and is amplified by intra-market 
networks. In this regard, macroprudential regulation should aim to ensure that a 
trader’s misconduct does not result in “manipulative contagion” that can expose
structural vulnerabilities in the financial markets and exacerbate systemic risk.
Ex post macroprudential regulations, therefore, would consider how 
manipulation impacts the safety and soundness of the financial system given the 
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increased interconnections among institutions and across market segments. Thus,
within a macroprudential framework, anti-manipulation laws and regulations 
would consider how and to what extent manipulative conduct can introduce or 
contribute to endogenous and exogenous shocks to the market.
Key to adopting a macroprudential approach to manipulation regulation will 
be to employ tools and strategies that enhance the resilience of intra-firm and
intra-market networks. The networks that connect the markets act as conduits of
contagion, therefore making it crucial to consider ways to disrupt the channels
through which manipulation can transmit systemic harms. In focusing on how to
limit or reduce the structural vulnerabilities that accompany manipulation, 
macroprudential regulation could consider how to mitigate against herding, 
thereby potentially limiting the systemic consequences of manipulation. Again,
exploration of these and other strategies would be valuable grounds for future 
research on the intersection between manipulation and financial stability. 
V 
CONCLUSION
This Article is a preliminary exploration of the potential macroeconomic 
consequences of market manipulation in the markets. Understanding and
appreciating how manipulation may increase systemic vulnerabilities is key to the 
development of a thoughtful macroprudential regulatory framework for the
financial markets. Although manipulation is typically limited in its reach, in
recent years the scope and impact of manipulative schemes have expanded such 
that manipulation can have macroeconomic consequences. The evolution and 
development of market manipulation have made it increasingly important to 
consider the linkages between manipulation and financial stability.  Manipulative 
schemes can transmit and amplify systemic harms in the market by weakening
intra-market networks, increasing volatility, and mispricing risk. As financial
regulation moves towards a more macroprudential approach, this Article
encourages inclusion of manipulation in the discourse, recognizing that it may
contribute to systemic vulnerabilities and be a source of macro-level market 
harm. 
